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SECURITIES AND CAPITAL STRUCTURES OF
FARMER COOPERATIVES IN CALIFORNIA
By FiAcis ir *
FROM the bargaining cooperative1 having minimum fixed assets
and receivables to the substantial marketing or purchasing coopera-
tive having extensive physical facilities and accounts receivable, each
farmer cooperative2 needs capital in order to function effectively as a
business entity. Very few farmer cooperatives in the United States
have tried with any success to obtain financing by public issuance of
securities. Most often, the farmer-patron supplies the capital out of
the proceeds or earnings generated by the cooperative itself.3
As is stated in the Agricultural Code, the cooperative associations
are non-profit "inasmuch as they are not organized to make profit for
themselves, as such, or for their members, as such, but only for their
members as producers."4 The proceeds or earnings payable to the
member-patron serve as a source of contributed capital. The member
undertakes by contract to supply needed capital to the cooperative
by authorizing it to deduct or retain part of the proceeds or earnings
which are payable to him.5 The sums which are deducted or retained
are then credited to the member's account, and he in turn receives a
security for the retained amount. It is elementary that without con-
tractual authority no such deduction or retention may be made.6
The discussion which follows is meant to serve as an introduction
to the two types of capital structures used in nonstock cooperatives:
the revolving fund capital form, and the base capital method. Also to
be discussed are the characteristics of the securities which are issued
to patrons pursuant to their contributions.
Capitalization of the Nonstock Cooperative
Although a cooperative organized under the Agricultural Code
* Member, San Francisco Bar.
1 CAL. AGRic. CODE § 54401.
2 The typical California farmer cooperative, the securities and capital
structure of which will be discussed here, is a nonstock corporation organized
under chapter 1, division 20 of the Agricultural Code.
3 Reinert v. California Almond Growers Exchange, 9 Cal. 2d 181, 186,
70 P.2d 190, 192 (1937).
4 CAL. AGMIC. CODE § 54033.
5 In Madison Avenue fashion farmer cooperatives have converted a
verb into a noun so that in cooperative parlance, "retain" is that which is
retained. Hence, the retentions or deductions are referred to as "retains."
6 Silveira v. Associated Milk Producers, 63 Cal. App. 572, 576, 219 P.
461, 463 (1923).
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may have capital stock, the trend in California has been to incorporate
nonstock farmer cooperatives. Many of the older capital stock coop-
eratives have been converted to nonstock associations. Hence, today
we have relatively few California farmer cooperatives organized with
shares of stock.7
The typical California nonstock farmer cooperative is capitalized
with so-called revolving fund type capital. Unlike capital stock, re-
volving fund capital has no statutory sanction, although some recog-
nition is found in the California Revenue and Taxation Code.8 It also
has received some limited judicial acceptance at the appellate level.9
The base capital method is a second form of capitalization which
is becoming more popular with nonstock cooperatives because of some
adverse tax consequences involved in the revolving fund method.1 0
Since the revolving fund method is the one most often used, a larger
part of the discussion will be devoted to this form of capitalization;
only a limited examination of the base capital method will be pre-
sented here.
The Revolving Fund
The revolving fund capital form1 is wholly contractual. Nor-
mally, it is elaborately provided for in the association's bylaws, with
some treatment in the articles of incorporation. This fulfills the re-
quirement regarding a statement of property rights and interests in
the association. 12 The property rights and interest of each member
of a nonstock association are usually unequal and are measured by,
but not identified with, their revolving fund credits. 3
The dual relationship of the farmer-member to his cooperative as
a patron and investor serves as a sound basis for the revolving fund
type of capital. During his patronage the member is currently con-
7 The capital structures of the stock cooperatives are, for the most part,
conventional. However, holders of common or voting stock are required to be
producers of agricultural products or associations of such producers. CAL.
AGRiC. CODE §§ 54231-33. Preferred shares normally carry no voting rights,
and dividends on any shares may not exceed 8 percent per annum. CAL.
AGRIC. CODE § 54120. For those farmer cooperatives which are exempt from
federal income tax under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 521, there are further re-
strictions on nonvoting preferred shares, the holders of which may not share
in the profits of the association in excess of permitted dividends (8 percent)
on dissolution or otherwise.
8 CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 17117.5, 24404.
9 For extant cases see text accompanying notes 43-53 infra.10 See text accompanying notes 74-76 infra.
11 Some cooperatives prefer "Investment Fund," "Capital Fund," or
other designation.
12 CAL. AGaic. CODE § 54081.
13 CALirnoiA FAmV AND RANcH LAW § 11.15 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed.
1967).
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tributing in accordance with a formula prescribed by the association's
board of directors pursuant to bylaw authority. This formula in-
variably relates volume of patronage to the obligation to contribute
capital by way of retains. When he ceases to be a patron-member,
ideally his capital will be "revolved out" (paid to him serially in full).
If a cooperative has built up sufficient capital, which together
with bank borrowings will adequately finance fixed assets and opera-
tions, it has reached a level of net worth which will justify the use of
funds from current retains to retire or revolve out the revolving fund
credits of the earliest year or priority. In this way, the capital goal is
achieved according to predetermined need, and there is only a shift
in the ownership of the revolving fund credits resulting from varying
production from year to year and turnovers in membership. This is,
of course, in tune with the concept of current patrons supplying the
capital in relation to their current patronage.
The Nature of the Revolving Fund Credit
If revolving fund credits or capital credits must be classified or
characterized, perhaps they can best be designated as hybrid securi-
ties. On an appropriate contractual foundation they are the net
worth of the cooperative, and informed creditors so regard them.
Basis in the Bylaws
It is fair to say that the typical California nonstock farmer coop-
erative having the revolving fund form of capital, and those few stock
cooperatives which also have revolving fund capital as well as shares
of stock, provide in their bylaws for the following:
1. The cooperative has authority to make retains giving rise to
the revolving fund credits.
2. The revolving fund credits are subject and subordinate to all
other obligations and debts of the association.
3. The revolving fund credits carry no voting rights; only mem-
bers vote. Nonmembers may hold revolving fund credits.
4. The credits do not mature until declared payable by the asso-
ciation's board of directors.
5. Revolving fund credits are subject to diminution for losses
which the board of directors determines are not properly charge-
able to operations (akin to reduction of stated capital to eliminate
a balance sheet loss).14
6. Payment of "interest" on revolving fund credits may be pro-
vided for or prohibited.15
14 CAL. CORP. CODE § 1904 authorizes such diminution.
15 Although commonly referred to as interest, it is a dividend on capital.
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7. Credits have an order of priority. Except on dissolution, the
credits of one year may not be retired until the credits of all prior
years have been paid. In some instances earlier payment to effect
a compromise or settle a dispute with a holder of revolving fund
credits is permitted. Under the adjusted balances or base capital
method,16 the year of priority loses its significance and retire-
ment is conditioned on amount of investment rather than year
of priority.
8. Provision is made for issuance of statements or certificates
to evidence revolving fund credits. These evidences of credits
would ordinarily be expected to be either "qualified written
notices of allocation" or "qualified per-unit retain certificates" as
defined in the Internal Revenue Code. 17
9. On dissolution all revolving fund credits (regardless of year
of priority) are of equal status, but no payment or distribution
may be made until all of the debts and liabilities of the association
have been paid or adequate provision has been made for payment.
Characteristics of the Securities
The patrons may be said to be parties to a kind of continuous sub-
scription agreement, resulting in an offset against proceeds or earnings
which would otherwise be currently payable to them. It may be said
that securities are issued as part of the cost of goods sold, or as a re-
duction or adjustment of the price of goods purchased, depending on
whether the cooperative is a marketing association or a purchasing
association.
It should be mentioned that not all member capital of farmer co-
operatives is produced by the retain method. Particularly in the case
of the new farmer cooperative, the first members make contributions
to the capital of the organization, for which they receive securities.
The funds thus contributed serve as sufficient net worth to merit
bank financing with which to begin operations. Generally, the secur-
ities resulting from out-of-pocket capital contributions assume no dif-
ferent form from those arising as a result of retentions from proceeds
or earnings. Some cooperatives require that the applicant for ad-
mission to membership make a capital contribution.
It should be noted that the membership fee device has long been
in disuse among farmer cooperatives in California.' s
16 Text accompanying notes 74-76 infra.
17 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1388Cc) (1) (B), (h) (1).
18 See, e.g., DeMello v. Dairyman's Co-operative Creamery, note 68 infra.
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Statutory Exemptions
The Agricultural Code' 9 exempts from the Corporate Securities
Law2° any securities of cooperatives organized or existing under
chapter 1, division 20, of the Agricultural Code.21
A farmer cooperative which is exempt from federal income tax22
is also exempt from regulation under the Securities Act of 1933.23 For
an agricultural cooperative association as defined in the Agricultural
Marketing Act,24 there is an exemption from registration require-
ments by virtue of the Securities Act amendments of 1964.25 The
Agricultural Marketing Act definition of a farmer cooperative is less
rigid than that found in the Internal Revenue Code; 26 hence, more
cooperatives are able to qualify for exemption under the amendments
than under the 1933 statute.
The Analogy to Shares
The Corporations Code 27 equates memberships of nonstock cor-
porations with shares, but revolving fund credits are not member-
ships. In one case,28 the court stated that the revolving fund credits
which were the subject of litigation were analogous to shares. There
is no California case holding that the securities of a nonstock coopera-
tive are shares, although there have been at least two cases2 9 in which
plaintiff-holders of revolving fund credits have alleged that they
were entitled to assert the rights of shareholders under the applicable
sections of the Corporations Code.
In one case,30 plaintiffs who held one-third of the revolving fund
credits (but not one-third of the memberships) of a California farmer
cooperative sought involuntary dissolution of the defendant coopera-
tive.3 ' The case was settled (without defendant's dissolution) before
19 CAL. AGrIc. CODE § 54201.
20 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-26104.
21 CAL. AGRic. CODE §§ 54001-294.
22 INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 521.
23 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (5) (1964).
24 12 U.S.C. § 1141j(a) (1964).
25 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2) (E) (1964).
26 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 521.
27 CAL. CoRPu. CODE §§ 103, 115.
28 Placerville Fruit Growers' Ass'n v. Irving, 135 Cal. App. 2d 731, 735,
287 P.2d 793, 797 (1955), discussed in text accompanying notes 35-41 infra.
29 Community Grape Corp. v. California Wine Ass'n, No. 71778 (San
Joaquin County Super. Ct., filed May 10, 1960) (settled before trial); Shannon
v. California Farm Bureau Marketing Ass'n, No. 63924 (Tulare County Super.
Ct., filed Aug. 17, 1966).
so Community Grape Corp. v. California Wine Ass'n, No. 71778 (San
Joaquin County Super. Ct., filed May 10, 1960) (settled before trial).
31 Involuntary dissolution of a corporation is dealt with in CAL. CORP.
CODE § 4650.
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trial. In another case,32 the plaintiff-holders of revolving fund credits
of the defendant cooperative took the position that they were entitled
to be considered dissenting shareholders in a corporate consolida-
tion.33 A demurrer to the second cause of action in the complaint
incorporating the dissenting shareholder theory was sustained. Plain-
tiffs amended the complaint by eliminating the second cause of action.
The action is still pending in the superior court.34
The case of Placerville Fruit Growers' Association v. Irving,35
involved a dispute between the son and daughter of a deceased patron
of the cooperative. Both claimed the sum due their father which
appeared on the books of the cooperative in the form of revolving
fund credits. The decedent had instructed the cooperative's manage-
ment to pay the sum due him to his daughter when he died. The deci-
sion of the court was that the cooperative held the credits as trustee
and that they may be the corpus of an express trust.36
The nature of the credits was carefully considered, and the con-
tractual basis of securities as laid down in the association's bylaws
was summarized.3 7 It can fairly be said that the bylaws of Placerville
Fruit Growers are representative of the bylaws of California farmer
cooperatives.38 Although the revolving fund credits are characterized
as an indebtedness, it is a kind of indebtedness that does not fit the
usual definition. There is no maturity date. The association's policy
of having a 5-year revolving cycle is of course neither inflexible nor
enforceable by the holder of revolving fund credits.
The bylaws provided that the retained funds could be commin-
gled and used for corporate purposes and that the money retained
need not be physically segregated or set apart. It should be empha-
sized that the bylaws clearly provided that the revolving fund shall
not be deemed a trust fund39 held for the holders of the revolving
fund credits, and that on dissolution all debts and liabilities shall be
paid or provided for before any distribution of assets to holders of
revolving fund credits.
The court said that "Et]he property interest of members whose
funds had been thus retained by the corporation was remarkably
analogous to the property interest of shareholders in an ordinary com-
32 Shannon v. California Farm Bureau Marketing Ass'n, No. 63924 (Tu-
lare County Super. Ct., filed Aug. 17, 1966).
33 Dissenting shareholders are treated in CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 4300-18.
34 Shannon v. California Farm Bureau Marketing Ass'n, No. 63924 (Tu-
lare County Super. Ct., filed Aug. 17, 1966).
35 135 Cal. App. 2d 731, 287 P.2d 793 (1955).
36 Id. at 736, 287 P.2d at 797.
37 Id. at 732, 287 P.2d at 794-95.
83 See discussion of typical bylaws at text accompanying notes 14-17
supra.
39 Cf. text accompanying notes 47-52 infra.
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mercial corporation ... ."40 The court went on to say that the
amounts declared payable (in the revolving process) are like divi-
dends paid out of surplus of the commercial corporation.41 It appears
that the analogy falls short of the court's approach. It is submitted
that declaring payable revolving fund credits of the earliest priority
is more analogous to a commercial corporation's calling a series of
redeemable preferred shares.
It would seem that although revolving fund credits have charac-
teristics of both share of stock and indebtedness, they are not properly
designated as either; they are sui generis.42
The Case Law
The following cases help to clarify the nature of the retains out
of proceeds or earnings. In addition many point up the need for an
appropriate contractual basis for the hybrid securities which farmer
cooperatives issue.
In Loomis Fruit Growers' Association v. California Fruit Ex-
change,43 the court quoted at length from the bylaws of the fruit ex-
change. The bylaws indicated that the withholdings out of earnings
were retains for an account designated "Withholdings Repayable."
The bylaws provided that the retains would mature in 5 years from
the last day of the year of withholding.44 Needless to say, the concept
of a maturity date on revolving fund credits is frowned upon by any
lender if the only capital of the association is represented by such a
capital fund. However, in the principal case, defendant was organ-
ized with capital stock and presumably its issued and outstanding
shares served as an adequate net worth.
In Mountain View Walnut Growers Association v. California Wal-
nut Growers Association,45 a local cooperative of walnut growers
sought recovery of retains made by a central marketing cooperative.
The fund resulting from retentions from proceeds by the central coop-
erative was described as "a reserve fund to carry on its future opera-
tions."4 6 This fund was not created pursuant to particular contrac-
tual authority; hence, defendant was willing to stipulate that the fund
was a trust fund. Prior to suit, the defendant association saw the
error of its ways in becoming a fiduciary of the retains for the local
cooperative, and in 1925 revised its contracts with its members to pro-
40 135 Cal. App. 2d 731, 735, 287 P.2d 793, 797 (1955).
41 Id. at 735-36, 287 P.2d at 797.
42 Tonilinson v. Massey, 308 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1962); Greenville Corp. v.
Comm'r, 40 T.C. 926 (1963).
43 128 Cal. App. 265, 16 P.2d 1040 (1932).
44 Id. at 269, 16 P.2d at 1042.
45 19 Cal. App. 2d 227, 65 P.2d 80 (1937).
46 Id. at 228, 65 P.2d at 81.
vide "for a reserve or other fund."47 The demand of plaintiffs was
confined to the pre-1925 retains. The court held that the plaintiffs
could not recover the retains until the new 15-year contract made in
1925 had run its course.48 The trust fund had existed at the time
of execution of the 1925 contract and was commingled with the fund
authorized under the contract. It therefore became a part of the fund
and subject to the contract.49
It is unfortunate to characterize a capital fund as a trust fund,
and careful draftsmanship can readily eliminate this hazardous con-
sequence.
Although California Walnut Growers Association (hereinafter
referred to as "Central") was not a party to the action, its retains
were also involved in Bogardus v. Santa Ana Walnut Growers Asso-
ciation.50 The "Present Operative Reserve Fund" of Central credited
to the defendant was created by retains from proceeds of walnuts
received from defendant's grower members and marketed through
Central. Plaintiff was such a grower member who sought to enjoin
the defendant from paying to growers who were no longer members
of defendant their share of Central's retains which had been declared
payable. The court took the position that when the retains were re-
volved or declared payable, they resumed their original character and
thus were deferred sales proceeds; the revolved amounts were payable
to the growers (whether or not their status as members continued)
from whose walnut proceeds the retains or deductions were originally
made. Here again the court referred to the fund as a trust fund.51
The court distinguished between the revolving fund of the local
association (i.e., the defendant) and Central's fund. In this reference
it held that the "Present Operative Reserve Fund" of Central was not
the property of the local association. 52 Of course, another result can
be achieved by contract, whether expressed in bylaws or otherwise.
The revolving fund of a central marketing association may be made
to be an investment reflected in the local association's revolving
fund or net worth in the same manner as its packing plant or other
facility.
Per-Unit Retains
The case of Reinert v. California Almond Growers Exchange,53
47 Id. at 229, 65 P.2d at 81.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 41 Cal. App. 2d 939, 108 P.2d 52 (1940).
51 Id. at 949, 108 P.2d at 58.
52 Id. at 949-50, 108 P.2d at 58.
53 9 Cal. 2d 181, 70 P.2d 190 (1937).
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illustrates the so-called "per-unit retain allocation" (1 cent per pound
of almonds) which is now defined in the Internal Revenue Code,54
as opposed to the allocation which is a patronage dividend and is
determined with reference to the net earnings of the cooperative.55
The plaintiff almond grower brought an action for an accounting of
the retains made by the marketing cooperative out of proceeds due
plaintiff's assignor. The court said:
Admittedly the appellant has a right to a substantial amount of money
representing a proportionate interest in the accumulations of the ex-
change from the contributions of its members.56
The court went on to state that the amounts to which plaintiff is
entitled as well as time of payment are issues that have to be passed
on by the trial court on retrial.
57
The precision now required of cooperatives under the Internal
Revenue Code58 and the awareness of need for precise accounting
which results from the development of cooperative tax law gener-
ally,59 seem to make less likely the uncertainty of a patron's interest
in a cooperative's capital funds exhibited in the Reinert case.
Driscoll v. East-West Dairymen's Association60 is another case
dealing with a per-unit retain. These retains were created by deduct-
ing from proceeds of milk and milk products one-half cent per pound
of butterfat delivered to the defendant cooperative association by its
members. The bylaws of the association designated the retains as
membership fees and the court called them "dues."' 61 The plaintiff-
member of the dairymen's cooperative brought the action for moneys
paid to the cooperative by plaintiff's assignors who withdrew from
the cooperative. The plaintiff's right and interest as a contributor to
the fund were conceded, but the court held that the association was
not obliged to distribute any amount represented by the fund until
dissolution of the association.
62
Actually the rights of the holder of revolving fund credits in the
average farmer cooperative in California are the same as those of the
plaintiff Driscoll. However, in most instances there is some plan of
revolving, although it is not obligatory.
63
54 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1388(f).
55 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1388(a). See Loomis Fruit Growers' Ass'n
v. California Fruit Exch., 128 Cal. App. 265, 16 P.2d 1040 (1932).
56 9 Cal. 2d 181, 189, 70 P.2d 190, 194 (1937).
57 Id.
58 IwT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1382-88.
,9 See Pomeroy Cooperative Grain Co. v. Comm'r, 288 F.2d 326 (8th Cir.
1961).
60 52 Cal. App. 2d 468, 126 P.2d 467 (1942).
61 Id. at 471, 126 P.2d at 468.
62 Id. at 474, 126 P.2d at 470.
63 See Loomis Fruit Growers' Ass'n v. California Fruit Exch., 128 Cal.
App. 265, 16 P.2d 1040 (1932), concerning revolving fund credits with a 5-year
maturity.
The court in Driscoll identified the retained amounts with the
"property rights and interests '64 of members in the association.6 5
Ordinarily, the "property rights and interests" of a member in a
nonstock cooperative (whatever they may be) are measured by the
member's revolving fund credits, but not identified with such credits.6
In practice, "property rights and interests" of members have little sig-
nificance in an operating cooperative. On dissolution they may be-
come meaningful if there are residual assets to distribute after pay-
ment of debts and revolving fund credits. Again, stress should be
laid on the necessity and advisability of providing for such matters
contractually. The litigated cases, for the most part, illustrate struc-
tural weakness.
Reorganization
Not all California cases involving so-called "retains" of farmer
cooperatives reflect what has come to be the basic legal structure of
the typical California farmer cooperative. The successive changes in
the tax laws have caused cooperatives to become more introspective.
Many more lawyers and accountants have become familiar with coop-
eratives and their operations as well as the need for an appropriate
contractual basis for the relationship between the cooperative and its
farmer-members.6 7
Perhaps DeMello v. Dairyman's Co-operative Creamery68 is most
important as a constitutional precedent involving the reserved power
of a corporation to amend its financial structure.6 9 To one interested
in the law relating to cooperatives, however, it presents an account
of a reorganization of a cooperative whose corporate structure was
outmoded and whose tax status was unfavorable.
The original bylaws of the cooperative provided that each member
pay $100 for his membership on which he would receive 8 percent per
64 CAL. AGRIc. CODE § 54081 (e).
65 52 Cal. App. 2d 468, 471, 126 P.2d 467, 468 (1942).
66 See text accompanying note 13 supra.
67 Perhaps the most influential instrument in bringing about the im-
provement of legal structures in California agricultural cooperatives has been
the Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives, one of 12 district banks for cooperatives
organized in 1933 pursuant to the Farm Credit Act of 1933 (12 U.S.C. §§ 1134-
1134m) to carry on the lending functions of the old Federal Farm Board on
a decentralized basis. The Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives, which is wholly
owned by its borrowers, makes sound business loans to farmer cooperatives
as defined in the Agricultural Marketing Act (12 U.S.C. § 1141j). Its thor-
ough examination of each applicant's legal structures and its awareness of the
needs of sound cooperatives have produced admirable results among borrow-
ing and nonborrowing farmer cooperatives.
68 73 Cal. App. 2d 746, 167 P.2d 226 (1946).
69 For authorization to amend corporate articles, see CAL. CoNsT. art. XII,
§ 1; CAL. Corn'. CODE §§ 3600-801.
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annum. Provision was also made for the return of the $100 on with-
drawal of the member. As the cooperative continued to market milk
products, numerous members went out of the dairy business, and
others marketed elsewhere without withdrawing their membership.
By 1944, there were 425 members with only 150 delivering their prod-
ucts to the association. About 550 nonmembers delivered their prod-
ucts to the cooperative. The association was also compelled to pay
federal income taxes.70
In 1944, the board of directors with the written consent of two-
thirds of the members reorganized the cooperative under chapter 4
of division 6 of the Agricultural Code. Auditors determined the net
worth of the association and fixed the amount at $1065 per member.
For the membership fee and allocable surplus each holder of a mem-
bership was given $100 in cash plus securities in the form of revolving
fund credits aggregating $965, even though under the previous mem-
bership fee structure the $100 membership fee was the measurement
of a member's rights in the cooperative. In this way, the cooperative
could revolve out the members who were no longer patronizing the
association, but who still had memberships outstanding.7 1
Plaintiffs contended that they were forced out of the association
by the reorganization and that they held a vested interest in its prop-
erty which was appropriated by the association.7 2 The court found
for the defendant-association saying that the members were not forced
out; that they were given an option to remain members with $1065
credits or to take the $1065 revolving fund credit (which was $965
more than their initial membership interest of $100) and withdraw;
and that changes in the rights of outstanding shares are not uncon-
stitutional if they can be justified as necessary to meet the exigencies
of the corporation.73
The Base Capital Method
Because of federal income tax considerations which call for cur-
rent taxability of retains either to the patron or the cooperative,74
some cooperatives are treating the revolving fund differently from the
method described above. Prior to the incorporation of subchapter
T75 into the Internal Revenue Code in 1962, retains of the kind cred-
ited to their patrons by most California farmer cooperatives were
not currently taxable at either the cooperative or patron level.7 6
70 73 Cal. App. 2d 746, 748, 167 P.2d 226, 227 (1946).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 749, 167 P.2d at 227.
73 Id. at 751, 167 P.2d at 228-29.
74 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1382, 1385.
75 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1382-88.
76 Long Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Comm'r, 249 F.2d 726 (4th Cir. 1957);
Now the associations, with few exceptions, take the steps necessary
to impose that current taxability on their patrons. The effect of old
untaxed retains being revolved out in the same year that taxable re-
tains are evidenced to the patrons is to produce a doubling up of taxa-
tion. The old retains not previously taxed become taxable upon re-
tirement, and the current retains are likewise taxable under sub-
chapter T.
Because of this doubling up of taxation, a trend may be developing
toward a more permanent type of capital to which the patron will
currently contribute only if the capital he has already invested is
short of an amount prescribed by formula. If his capital is in excess
of the amount required by the patronage formula, his investment will
be reduced through payment by the cooperative or sale to a member
whose capital is short. In other words, there are no payments of
credit or current retains except in individual cases where the patron-
age is not in balance with the capital previously contributed or re-
tained. There results a substantial avoidance of the tax on old retains.
This "adjusted balances" or "base capital" concept is not new, but
its use now has appeal particularly to producers with large retain
accounts in one or more cooperatives. Private Internal Revenue rul-
ings have indicated that the adoption of this method by a cooperative
which formerly retired all retains of the earliest priority with funds
made available from current retentions will not have adverse tax
consequences.
Conclusion
Among California farmers and ranchers who extend their busi-
ness into cooperative marketing and purchasing associations designed
and operated for the benefit of their members as producers, there has
developed a distinct preference for the cooperative corporate form of
the nonstock association.
A unique and workable means of capitalization has evolved for
the farmer cooperative wherein the member-patrons of the association
are holders of hybrid securities which in form are neither shares of
stock nor true debt. These securities represent the net worth of the
organization. The amount of such securities held is related as nearly
as practicable to the holder's patronage of the cooperative.
Most commonly the capital fund is called a revolving fund, and
the interests of the members are referred to as revolving fund cred-
its. The basis of the revolving fund and revolving fund credits is
Moe v. Earle, 226 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1955); Carpenter v. Comm'r, 219 F.2d 635
(5th Cir. 1955); Estate of Caswell v. Comm'r, 211 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1954);
San Joaquin Valley Poultry Producers' Ass'n v. Comm'r, 136 F.2d 382 (9th
Cir. 1943).
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wholly contractual. The cases and the practical experience of the
farmer cooperatives have led to a development of safeguards which
are normally incorporated into the association's bylaws. The capital
structure so provided serves as a bulwark against unwarranted as-
saults by disgruntled members or former members as well as a sub-
stantial foundation which is respected by banks and creditors.

